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Charitable solicitation in the U.S. is regulated by “the several
States.” For most of the nation’s history, charities tended to be
local endeavors, raising money and providing relief in their
immediate vicinities. In the latter half of the twentieth century,
charities increasingly grew beyond these local origins as new
technologies enabled even the smallest charities to develop a
national reach with direct mail and telemarketing campaigns.
Nevertheless, primary authority for regulating charitable
solicitations remained with the states.
I.

REGULATION BY THE STATES

The states retain the general police power to regulate the
solicitation of charitable contributions from their residents and
within their jurisdictions. Forty-three states and the District of
Columbia have exercised this power by enacting statutes regulating
1
Although the states posit various
charitable solicitations.
† Charles H. Nave, P.C., Roanoke, Virginia; B.A., Williams College, 1991;
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1999. Mr. Nave has been assisting
nonprofits and fundraisers in their efforts to comply with and/or challenge state
and local charitable solicitation acts and ordinances since 1999.
1. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-9-70 to 13A-9-84 (1994 & Supp. 2003); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 45.68.010 to 45.68.900 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-6551 to 446561 (West 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-28-401 to 4-28-416 (Michie 2003); CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500 to 17510.85, 17200 to 17209 (West 1997 & Supp.
2004); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12599 to 12599.5 (West 1992 & Supp. 2004); COLO.
REV. STAT. tit. 6, art. 16 (2002 & Supp. 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 21a-175 to 21a1901 (1994 & Supp. 2004); D.C. STAT. §§ 44-1701 to 44-1714 (2001 & Supp. 2004);
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justifications for these statutes, they typically boil down to two main
2
The public
reasons: public disclosure and fraud prevention.
disclosures most typically sought by these statutes are disclosure of
the purpose for which contributions are solicited and disclosure of
3
the manner in which contributions are actually used. Although
many statutes criminalize any violation of the Charitable
4
Solicitation Act (which would necessarily include missing a
deadline or failure to include the proper wording of a required
disclosure on a solicitation device), they also clarify the meaning of
5
“fraud” in the context of charitable solicitations.

FLA. STAT. ch. 496 (2002 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-17-1 to 43-17-23
(2002); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 467B-1 to 467B-13 (2002); ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 460/0.01
to 460/23 (2000); IND. CODE §§ 23-7-8-1 to -9, 24-5-12-25 (1994 & Supp. 2004);
IOWA CODE §§ 13C.1 to 13C.8 (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1759 to -1775 (1995);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 367.650 to 367.670 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1901-1909.1 (West 1987 & Supp. 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, ch. 385,
§§ 5001-5016 (West 1997); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. §§ 6-101 to 6-701 (1992-1998
& Supp. 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 8 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 400-271
to 400-294 (1997); MINN. STAT. §§ 309.50 to 309.72 (2002); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 7911-501 to 79-11-529 (1973-2001); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.450 to 407.489 (2001);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7:19 to 7:19-b (2001); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 45:17A-18 to
45:17A-40 (1995 & Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-22-1 to 57-22-11 (Michie
2003); N.Y. EXEC. LAW art. 7-A, §§ 171-a to 177 (McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 131F-1 to 131F-4 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-22-01 to -05 (1999 & Supp.
2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1716-01 to 1716-17, 1716-99 (West 1994 & Supp.
2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 552.1 to 552.18, 553.3 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§
128.801 to 128.898 (2003 & Supp. 2004); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 162.1 to 162.24
(West 1999 & Supp. 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-53-1 to 5-53-14 (1999 & Supp.
2003); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-56-10 to 33-56-200 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 2003);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101-501 to 48-101-521 (2002 & Supp. 2003); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. § 9023e (Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-22-1 to 13-22-23 (2001 &
Supp. 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2451 to 2479 (1993 & Supp. 2003); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 57-48 to 57-69 (Michie 2003 & Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19-09-010
to 19-09-915 (1999 & Supp. 2004); W. VA. CODE §§ 29-19-1 to 29-19-15b (2001 &
Supp. 2004); WIS. STAT. §§ 440.41 to 440.48 (1998 & Supp. 2003). Only Delaware,
Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming have refrained
from enacting such laws.
2. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17510(b) (1997 & Supp. 2004); FLA.
STAT. ch. 496.402 (2002 & Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-1 (2003); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 162.2 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004).
3. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 496.402 (2002 & Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
131F-1 (2003); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 162.2 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004).
4. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 309.581 (2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-11-529 (19732001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 552.18 (1999); PA. STAT. ANN. tit., 10 § 162.15(a)(1)
(West 1999 & Supp. 2004).
5. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-190h (1994 & Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 367.667 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 174-d (McKinney 2004);
PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 10, §§ 162.15(a)(3)-(13) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004).
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6

To effect these goals, most Charitable Solicitation Acts require
that charities secure a state charitable solicitation permit or license
or otherwise register with the state prior to soliciting charitable
7
contributions. Fortunately, thirty-three jurisdictions accept one
8
form, the Unified Registration Statement (URS), for initial
registrations. Six states require charities to file different forms
9
promulgated by their own administrative agencies. This initial
“registration” consists primarily of a financial report and
organizational information. Most jurisdictions accepting the URS
allow registrants to satisfy the financial report requirement by
6. For convenience, this article will refer to these enactments generally as
“Charitable Solicitation Acts.” The actual enactments themselves are variously
entitled “Charitable Solicitations Act” (e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-16-101 (2002 &
2003 Supp.); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-17-1 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, ch. 385, §
5001 (West 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-22-1 (Michie 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 1322-1 (2001 & Supp. 2004)), “Solicitation of Contributions Act” (e.g., FLA. STAT. ch.
496, § 496.401 (2002 & Supp. 2004)), “Charitable Organizations and Solicitations
Act” (e.g. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1759 (1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.271 (1997)),
“Charitable Registration and Investigation Act” (e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 45:17A-18
(1995 & Supp. 2004)), “Solicitation of Charitable Contributions Act” (e.g., OKLA.
STAT. tit. 18, § 552.1 (1999)), “Solicitation of Funds for Charitable Purposes Act”
(e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 162.1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004)), “Solicitation of
Charitable Funds Act” (e.g., S.C. CODE. ANN. § 33-56-10 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp.
2003); W. VA. CODE § 29-19-1 (2001 & Supp. 2004)), and other variations on the
same theme.
7. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5004.1C (West 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 131F-5(a) (2003); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 162.5(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004).
8. The Unified Registration Statement (URS) is a product of a collaboration
between the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), the National
Association of State Charities Officials (NASCO), and the Multi-State Filer Project,
Inc.
The URS forms and instructions can be downloaded from
http://www.multistatefiling.org/urs_webv231.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004)
[hereinafter URS pdf]. The URS is accepted by Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See URS pdf at 28-37.
9. Alaska, Arizona, and Florida do not accept the URS. See id. at 38.
Colorado is the only state that requires charities to register online. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 6-16-110.5 (3) (2002 & Supp. 2003); 8 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1505-9.1(1)
(2004). Although it appears from the most recent version of the URS that both
Oklahoma and North Carolina accept the URS form, this is not accurate.
Oklahoma has not accepted URS forms since it adopted a new document
management system which does not support the URS in a scanned format. And
North Carolina accepts either its own form or its own form plus the URS. In other
words, a charity must fill out the form promulgated by the Charitable Solicitation
Licensing Section of the North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State. A
charity may choose to fill out the URS also.
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submitting a copy of their most recent IRS Form 990.
The
organizational information ranges from the mundane (e.g., name,
address, and Taxpayer Identification Number) to the practical
(e.g., the “purposes and programs of the organization”) to the
esoteric (e.g., whether any of the organization’s directors have
11
been convicted of a misdemeanor). In addition, many states also
require a registration fee and submission of copies of the
organization’s articles of incorporation, bylaws, IRS determination
12
letter, and fundraising contracts.
This initial registration is only the beginning of the process.
To remain in compliance, charities must make additional filings in
each state in subsequent years. Each state requiring registration
also requires registered charities to make an annual financial
13
report. Most states allow registrants to satisfy this requirement by
14
simply providing a copy of the organization’s IRS Form 990.
However, other states require the financial information to be
15
restated on separate forms promulgated by the states’ regulators.
10. IRS Form 990 is the “informational” tax return that most nonprofits must
file with the IRS annually. Some states accepting the IRS Form 990 as an annual
report also require submission of an audited financial statement depending on the
applicant’s gross revenues in the most recent fiscal year. See URS pdf, supra note 8,
at 28-37. Although Mississippi, Tennessee, and West Virginia accept the URS and
require submission of the applicant’s most recent IRS Form 990, each of these
states also require applicants to submit an additional financial report form. See id.
at 17-18, 24-26. Among states that do not accept the URS, Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, and Florida accept IRS Form 990 in lieu of their own financial report
forms. North Carolina and Oklahoma require registrants to fill out forms
promulgated by their administrative agencies in addition to submitting their IRS
Form 990.
11. See id. at 6-8.
12. See id. at 43 (summarizing these requirements).
13. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 496.407(1) (2004); ILL. COMP. STAT. 460/4(a)
(2004); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-b (McKinney 2004).
14. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 496.407(2) (2002 & Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 367.657(3) (Banks-Baldwin 2002); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-49(A), 57-49(A)(6)
(Michie 2003 & Supp. 2004). Many states also require submission of the
organization’s audited financial statement if the registrant’s gross revenues
exceeded a certain level in the previous fiscal year. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 171763(c) (1995) (requiring filing of audited financial report if contributions
exceeded $100,000 in the previous fiscal year); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-b(1)
(McKinney 2004) (requiring same if gross revenues exceeded $250,000 in the
previous fiscal year); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-101-506(b)(2)(A) (2004) (requiring
same if gross revenues exceeded $300,000 in the previous fiscal year).
15. The process is complicated by the fact that the states requiring a separate
financial report form for annual reports is not the same set of states (see supra text
accompanying note 10) requiring one for initial registrations. For example, New
York does not require any financial report form besides the IRS Form 990 for an
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Many states require that the registration, which details the
organizational information, be renewed. In most cases, the
16
renewal and annual report are considered one filing. However,
some states effectively require that charities file separate
17
registration renewals and annual reports.
This entire process is further complicated by still more filings
and by local ordinances regulating charitable solicitations. Six
jurisdictions require charities to engage registered agents located
within their borders even though the charity has no contact with
the jurisdiction other than soliciting contributions from its
18
residents. And many jurisdictions require charities to register as
19
foreign corporations merely because they solicit residents through
20
direct mail, telemarketing, or the Internet. Finally, localities are
initial registration, but for annual reports New York requires submission of both
an IRS Form 990 and New York’s own form CHAR497. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-b(1)
(McKinney 2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/forms/
char497.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
16. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-5(c) (2003); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§
162.5(a)-(e) (1999 & Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-49 (2003 & Supp. 2004).
17. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-402(a)(1)(A) (Michie 2003) (requiring
registration before solicitation; although the statute is not explicit on this point, in
practice Arkansas issues licenses that expire after one year and must be renewed
prior to the anniversary of the registration date); id. § 4-28-403 (requiring annual
reports to be filed on or before May 15 of each year, although extensions are
available and organizations can apply for another due date if its fiscal year does
not coincide with the calendar year); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-56-30(A) (Law. Co-op.
1990 & Supp. 2004) (requiring organizations to “file a registration statement . . .
by July first of each year but in all cases prior to solicitation.”); id. § 33-56-60
(requiring organizations to “file . . . an annual report of its financial activities . . .
within four and one-half months of the close of the organization’s fiscal year. . . .”
although extensions are available); WIS. STAT. § 440.08(2)(a)23m (1998 & Supp.
2003) (requiring charitable organizations to renew registrations prior to August 1,
2004); id. § 440.42(3)(a) (requiring charitable organizations to file annual reports
within six months of the previous fiscal year end).
18. The jurisdictions are the District of Columbia, Illinois, Michigan,
Mississippi, New Mexico, and North Dakota. See URS pdf, supra note 8, at 28-37.
19. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2105(a) (West 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
271B.15-010(1) (Banks-Baldwin 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-134(1) (1999 &
Supp. 2003).
20. Regulation of solicitations conducted over the Internet has been a
nettlesome issue. Nearly all Charitable Solicitation Acts were enacted before the
Internet came into widespread use in the mid-to-late 1990s. And most such Acts
had defined “solicitation” broadly. For example, New York defines “solicit” as
“[t]o directly or indirectly make a request for a contribution, whether express or
implied, through any medium. A ‘solicitation’ shall be deemed to have taken place
whether or not a contribution is made.” N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 171-a(10) (McKinney
2002 & Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). Kansas defines “solicitation” as “any
request or appeal, either oral or written, or any endeavor to obtain, seek or plead
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free to enact their own charitable solicitation ordinances requiring
21
22
registration as well; at least four localities have already done so.
The various registration requirements do not conflict with
23
each other. They are, however, duplicative and burdensome.
for funds, property, financial assistance or other thing of value. . . .” KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-1760(f) (1995) (emphasis added). Tennessee defines “solicit” as “any
oral or written request, however communicated, whether directly or indirectly, for a
contribution.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-101-501(9) (2002 & Supp. 2003) (emphasis
added). Thus, even a “passive solicitation” website that merely described a
charitable organization and allowed site visitors to donate via credit card, a private
payment service, or other means would trigger a registration requirement under
many state Charitable Solicitation Acts. However, the nonprofit community and
regulators realized that literal application of these definitions to charities’
webpages containing passive solicitations would likely raise numerous Due Process
constitutional issues. After all, even though the charities could reasonably expect
that residents of numerous jurisdictions would access the website and perhaps
contribute, the charities had not purposefully availed themselves of the
jurisdictions’ markets or courts and had no other contact with it. Under such
circumstances, regulatory jurisdiction over the charities would be unconstitutional.
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S.
102, 112-14 (1987). See also Am. Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation,
Inc. v. Pinellas County, 221 F.3d 1211, 1216-18 (11th Cir. 2000).
To address the issue, NASCO approved the “Charleston Principles” on
March 14, 2001, which advises regulators on various aspects of charitable
solicitations conducted via the Internet. Insofar as the Charleston Principles
addressed charitable solicitations conducted via the Internet by nonresident
charities that would otherwise not have to register in a jurisdiction, NASCO
essentially recommended that these charities should be compelled to register in
that particular jurisdiction if: (a) the charity used the Internet to specifically target
(via email or other methods) donors in that jurisdiction or (b) the charity received
contributions from that jurisdiction on a “repeated and ongoing basis or a
substantial basis through its Web site.” NASCO, THE CHARLESTON PRINCIPLES §
III.B.1 (2001), at http://www.nasconet.org/public.php?pubsec=4&curdoc=10 (last
visited Oct. 1, 2004) [hereinafter CP Website]. It is important to remember that
the Charleston Principles are not legally binding, but merely represent the
“informal, nonbinding advice of the NASCO Board of Directors to NASCO
members.” Id. Nevertheless, thus far the author is unaware of any instance in
which a state has repudiated the Charleston Principles either explicitly or
implicitly since their promulgation.
21. Many Charitable Solicitation Acts contain provisions explicitly providing
that the Act does not prohibit localities from enacting their own charitable
solicitation ordinances requiring an additional layer of registration with the
locality. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 496.421 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 367.669 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-63 (Michie 2003).
22. COLUMBUS, OHIO, CODE §§ 525.01-.23. (2004); JEFFERSON CO., KY., CODE §§
117.01 et seq. (2004); LOS ANGELES, CAL., CODE §§ 44.00-.15 (2004); PINELLAS CO.,
FLA., CODE §§ 42-266 to 42-344 (2004).
23. Not only are the various state filings duplicative of each other, they
substantially duplicate federal law. In order to inform the public as to how
charitable contributions are spent, State Charitable Solicitation Acts require
charities to file IRS Forms 990, or to file state-designed forms that largely
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The net effect of all these statutes and ordinances is that the typical
charity that solicits contributions nationwide must meet at least
24
forty-two deadlines per year and pay $3400 to $5500 per year in
25
filing fees, registered agent fees, and other direct expenses.
Additionally, the charity must expend significant resources on
accountants, attorneys, and administrative staff to remain in
26
compliance with each regulating jurisdiction. Every dollar spent
rearrange data from the IRS Form 990 (for an example of an annual report form
that merely seeks IRS Form 990 information in a different format, see Tennessee
Form SS-6002, available at http://www.state.tn.us/sos/forms/ss-6002.pdf (last
visited Oct. 1, 2004), which goes so far as to have line by line instructions merely
mandating that the registrant rearrange its IRS Form 990 data in a different
order), or to file both. However, federal law already requires that charities
provide copies of their IRS Forms 990 directly to the public either at their offices
or through the mail free of charge. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6104(d)-1 to -3 (2004).
Moreover, to the extent that Charitable Solicitations Acts prohibit fraud in
charitable solicitations, they are also arguably duplicative of state and federal laws
prohibiting fraud and false pretenses in general terms. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.375 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-178 (Michie 1996
& Supp. 2004).
24. As noted above, charities must meet deadlines for renewals, annual
reports, and registration as a foreign corporation. The number of deadlines that a
charity must meet varies based on where the charity solicits (for example, certain
charities refuse to solicit in localities that require registration in addition to
registration with the state in which the locality sits) and the various exemptions
from registration written into state Charitable Solicitation Acts. For example,
different states have different minimum gross revenue thresholds before
registration is required. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 162.6(a)(8) (West 1999 &
Supp. 2004) (exempting from the registration requirement organizations
receiving less than $25,000 in contributions annually); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a190d(6) (1999 & Supp. 2004) (exempting organizations receiving less than
$50,000 in contributions annually); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1762(d) (1995)
(exempting organizations receiving less than $10,000 in contributions annually).
25. These expense figures are based on the author’s experience with his
clients. The total amount of registration expenses (excluding professional and
administrative expenses) paid by a charity varies based upon the charity’s gross
revenues, as several states have a sliding registration fee scale based on the
registrant’s gross revenues.
26. Only part of the expenses imposed by state Charitable Solicitation Acts is
attributable to the registration process. These Acts also require that certain
language appear in fundraising contracts. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 173-a
(McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2003) (mandating that contracts between charities and
fundraisers contain cancellation provisions and other terms); MD. CODE ANN., BUS.
REG. § 6-501(d)(c) (Michie 1997) (mandating that agreements with parties
engaged to process contributions be attached to fundraising contracts); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 162.8(d) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004) (mandating that contracts
contain a statement of the charitable purpose for which the contributions are
solicited and requiring certain disclosures be made during solicitations).
The mandatory disclosure issue can be particularly vexing. Mandatory
disclosures of the charity’s name and address (see, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §
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on registration fees, staff time, accountants, or attorneys is a dollar
that cannot be devoted to the organization’s charitable purpose.
II. THE FEDERAL ROLE
Given the redundancy and complexity of regulation by states
and localities, it would seem much more rational and efficient to
regulate charitable solicitations at the federal level. Although the
27
Commerce Clause empowers the federal government to regulate
28
nationwide charitable solicitations, Congress has not chosen to do
so.
To be sure, federal law controls many facets of a nonprofit
organization’s activities. Its very status as a tax-exempt organization
29
is primarily a creature of federal income tax law.
Federal law
30
determines what contributions are tax-deductible, whether and in
what form an organization’s financial activities must be released to
31
the public, and which revenue generating activities will be taxed

17510.3(a)(1) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 496.411(2)(a) (West 2002 & Supp.
2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5012 (West 2004)), charitable purpose (see, e.g.,
IND. CODE § 23-7-8-6(a)(4) (West 1994 & Supp. 2004); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 174-b(2)
(McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.556(1)(c) (2004)), and
procedures to request additional information (see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. §
6-411 (Michie 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-9(b)(3) (2003); W. VA. CODE § 29-19-8
(2001 & Supp. 2004)) are not onerous. However, various states require an
additional disclosure statement, each informing potential donors that financial
information is available from the respective state’s regulatory offices. Thus, a
national direct mail solicitation campaign must contain each appropriate
disclosure (most statutes either explicitly or implicitly require a verbatim
reprinting of a mandated disclosure) even though the only material variation
between them is the regulator’s address. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 496.411(3) (2002
& Supp. 2004); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 6-411 (Michie 1998); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 79-11-523(3) (2003); N.J. REV. STAT. § 45:17A-38 (2003); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13,
§§ 48-11.2(a), (d) (1995 & Supp. 2004); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 174-b.1 (McKinney 2002
& Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-9(c) (2003); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
162.13(c) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-55.3 (Michie 2003);
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.09.100(4) (West 1998 & Supp. 2004); W. VA. CODE § 29-19-8
(2001 & Supp. 2004).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
28. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
583-86 (1997). See also Chapman v. Comm’r of Revenue, 651 N.W.2d 825, 833
(Minn. 2002).
29. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1992-1998 & Supp. 2003). See also, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §
79-32, 113 (1997); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-104(2) (Michie 1997); VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-1 (Michie 2000).
30. I.R.C. § 170 (2004).
31. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6104(d)-1 to -3 (2004).
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32

notwithstanding the organization’s tax-exempt status. Federal law
even regulates specific aspects of charitable solicitation activity such
33
as: 1) sweepstakes campaigns promoted through the U.S. Mail;
and 2) how quickly and clearly potential donors must be told which
charitable organization is making the call and its exact purpose to
34
solicit funds.
More importantly, federal courts have protected charities’ First
Amendment right to solicit contributions and to engage third
35
parties to do so on their behalf. But federal Commerce Clause
jurisprudence may offer a means of bringing order and efficiency
to the complicated welter of statutes, ordinances, and regulations
currently governing charitable solicitations.
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that the Commerce
Clause does more than delegate to Congress the power to regulate
36
interstate commerce; “it has a negative sweep as well.”
“The
negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits
state . . . regulation that . . . unduly burdens interstate commerce
and thereby ‘imped[es] free private trade in the national
37
marketplace.’” Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence makes
an immediate distinction between state and local statutes that
affirmatively discriminate against interstate commerce and those
38
that simply burden interstate commerce incidentally.
As
32. I.R.C. § 501(b) (2004).
33. 39 U.S.C. § 3001(k) (2004).
34. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iv)(e)(1)(2)
(2004).
35. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781-82 (1988)
(holding that regulations of the content of charitable solicitation messages are
subject to “exacting First Amendment scrutiny.”); Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph
H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 966 (1984) (reaffirming that it is a “fundamentally
mistaken premise” for legislators to believe that “high solicitation costs are an
accurate measure of fraud”); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444
U.S. 620, 636 (1980) (holding that regulators cannot withhold licenses or
implicitly label charities as fraudulent simply because they spend a certain
percentage of their gross receipts on fundraising, salaries and overhead).
36. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992).
37. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) (citations omitted).
38. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). Those statutes that
affirmatively discriminate against interstate commerce are virtually per se invalid.
Id. at 148. This principle was recently affirmed in the context of charitable
contributions. Chapman v. Comm’r, 651 N.W.2d 825, 834 (Minn. 2002). The
Chapman court held that a statute allowing tax deductions for contributions to
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Charitable Solicitation Acts impose nearly identical regulatory
39
burdens on both in-state and out-of-state charities, this article will
consider these statutes only in light of the latter–-the “incidental
burden”–-line of cases.
The leading case in the incidental burden line of decisions is
40
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., which sets forth the “Pike test”:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
41
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
It is well settled that the Charitable Solicitation Acts are
42
enacted to effectuate legitimate local purposes. In this light, the
Pike test for Charitable Solicitation Acts is a two-part test; courts
look to: 1) whether the burden a regulation imposes is clearly
excessive in relation to the local benefits; and 2) whether the state
or local interests could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
43
interstate activities.
Although the Pike test appears to be a simple balancing test, in
44
practice it is difficult to overturn a statute under the Pike test. The
Minnesota charities but not for contributions to non-Minnesota charities was
facially discriminatory against interstate commerce. Id. at 835. The court struck
down the statute because it did not advance a legitimate local purpose that could
not be adequately served by reasonably nondiscriminatory alternatives. Id. at 838.
39. See, e.g., Am. Target Adver., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1254 (10th Cir.
2000). The only conceivable disparate burden that might be born by an out-ofstate charity but not by an in-state charity is registration as a foreign corporation.
And this burden is typically imposed by a state’s corporation code and not by its
Charitable Solicitation Act. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2105(a) (West 1990 &
Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.15-010(1) (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1019.1-134(1) (2001).
40. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
41. Id. at 142 (citation omitted).
42. Vill. of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636-37
(1980) (referring to Schaumberg’s interests in protecting the public from fraud
and promoting residential privacy and public safety as “substantial” and
“legitimate”).
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 217 (2d Cir.
2004) (explaining that under the Pike test an unequal burden must be shown);
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Supreme Court itself has remarked on its own reluctance to
invalidate under the Dormant Commerce Clause “state legislation
in the field of safety where the propriety of local regulation has
45
long been recognized.”
One case, though, stands out as a model for a potentially
successful challenge to Charitable Solicitation Acts on Dormant
Commerce Clause grounds. In Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v.
46
Rice, the Supreme Court invalidated a trucking regulation under
the Pike test. The Raymond court noted that the regulation’s benefit
was difficult to discern. The regulation at issue prohibited sixty-five
47
foot, double-trailer trucks on Wisconsin highways.
Although
Wisconsin argued the regulation improved highway safety, the
plaintiff undermined that claim by producing “uncontradicted
evidence that the difference in passing time [did] not pose an
appreciable threat” to safety and that Wisconsin had allowed
48
numerous exceptions to the vehicle length regulation.
In
response, Wisconsin “virtually defaulted in its defense of the
49
regulations as a safety measure.”
As for the burden, plaintiffs
demonstrated “without contradiction” that the regulations
increased shipping costs, slowed the movement of goods in
interstate commerce, and limited the number of “interline
50
transfers” it could accept. In light of the evidence adduced at
51
trial, the Court held that the regulation failed the Pike test.
Of course, one cannot reasonably expect a regulator to fail to
defend a Charitable Solicitation Act as Wisconsin did in Raymond.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 207 (2d Cir. 2003)
(characterizing the Pike test as “permissive”); Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 330 F.3d
904, 914 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding no legitimate state interest was offered to justify
the burden on interstate commerce); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v.
Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 83 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that the Pike balancing test
calls for a low level of scrutiny); Kleenwell Biohazard Waste & Gen. Ecology
Consultants, Inc. v. Nelson, 48 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the
party challenging a regulation must establish that the burdens the regulation
impose clearly outweigh the local benefits).
45. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978) (quoting
Pike, 397 U.S. at 143). N.B. Fraud prevention would likely be considered as an
equally proper field for state legislation, if not explicitly considered as a species of
“safety” regulation.
46. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
47. Id. at 442 (citing WIS. STAT. § 348.07(1) (1975)).
48. Id. at 444-45.
49. Id. at 444.
50. Id. at 445.
51. Id. at 447.
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However, a strong case can be made both that the local benefits of
such enactments are illusory and that the burdens they impose are
52
significant. As discussed above, Charitable Solicitation Acts
arguably provide no marginal local benefits. To the extent that
these Acts disclose to the public the purpose for which
contributions are solicited and the manner in which contributions
are actually used, they are essentially redundant.
IRS Form 990 requires charities to disclose the purpose for
53
which their contributions are solicited. And, of course, IRS Form
990 requires explanation of exactly how contributions are spent in
54
Most importantly, Treasury regulations
a given fiscal year.
mandate that charities make their IRS Forms 990 available to the
public free of charge either at the charity’s office or through the
55
mail.
In light of this existing reporting and disclosure
requirement, it is difficult to imagine what local disclosure benefit
is added by a Charitable Solicitation Act. It would seem that states
allowing charities to simply file their IRS 990 Forms as an annual
56
financial report would be particularly vulnerable to this argument.
And while Charitable Solicitation Acts often single out particular
57
solicitation acts as fraudulent, such acts are generally prohibited
58
in general terms by broadly written criminal fraud statutes and by
the common law.
Meanwhile, the burdens imposed by Charitable Solicitation
Acts are certainly nontrivial and difficult to dispute. In Raymond,
the burdens considered clearly excessive in relation to the benefits
were increased costs for the regulated party, slowing the movement

52. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
53. See IRS Form 990, Part III (2003).
54. See id. Part II.
55. Treas. Reg. § 301.6104(d)-1(a) (2004). Charities are allowed to charge
reasonable expenses for photocopying and mailing. Id.
56. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 9, § 12.010 (Michie 2002); FLA. STAT.
ANN. ch. 496.407(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367-657
(2002).
57. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1769(h) (1995) (prohibiting the use of
donations for purposes other than those stated in solicitations); MD. CODE ANN.,
BUS. REG. § 6-607 (Michie 1998) (prohibiting use of false or materially misleading
advertising or promotional material in connection with a charitable solicitation);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:28-f, I(d) (2001) (prohibiting use of a name, symbol, or
statement so closely related or similar to that used by another charitable trust that
the use thereof would tend to confuse or mislead a solicited person).
58. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.375 (2001);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-178 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2004).
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59

of interstate goods, and limitations on trading partners.
Charitable Solicitation Acts impose at least comparable burdens.
The costs imposed by Charitable Solicitation Acts include the direct
expenses such as registration fees and registered agent fees which
can range from $3400 to $5500, the administrative expense of
preparing and filing more than forty forms each year, and the
professional fees for the attorney and accountant services necessary
60
to compile the information and remain in compliance. Just as the
regulation at issue in Raymond, Charitable Solicitation Acts
routinely slow interstate commerce and place a limit on the
number of legal trading partners. Many states explicitly prohibit
charities and fundraisers from contracting with each other unless
61
both are registered. In addition to the registration requirement,
many states also require that the parties first register their
fundraising contracts and make other filings before any particular
62
solicitation campaign can begin.
Certainly there is material available to make the case that “the
burden imposed . . . is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits” and that the “local interest involved . . . could be
63
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”
This is especially true since so much of the local benefit is already
64
promoted by Federal regulations and existing fraud laws. This is
not to say that such an argument is necessarily likely to succeed.
65
Such challenges are typically disfavored and one such direct
66
attempt has already failed in Public Citizen, Inc. v. Pinellas County.
In Public Citizen, the plaintiffs produced significant evidence of
the burden that the Pinellas County ordinance placed upon
charitable solicitation. The plaintiffs noted that a) the ordinance
had caused them to stop soliciting in Pinellas County and that their
59. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 445-46 (1978).
60. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 172.1, 172-d.10, 172-d.12, 173.1, 173-a.1
(McKinney 2002 & Supp. 200); 10 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 162.5(a), 162.8(a) (West
1999 & Supp. 2004); and TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101-504(a), 48-101-507(a) (2002
& Supp. 2003).
62. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 172-d.5, 172-d.6 (McKinney 2002 & Supp.
2004); 10 PA. CONS. STAT. § 162.8(d) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 13-22-9(1)(b)(vii)(C), (D), 13-22-9(1)(b)(viii)(C), (D) (2001 & Supp. 2004);
VA. CODE ANN. § 57-54 (Michie 2003).
63. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
64. See supra notes 57 and 58 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 44 and 45 and accompanying text.
66. 321 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
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commerce with that jurisdiction had “dropped off substantially”; b)
any charity choosing not to register with the county “loses an
opportunity to engage in interstate commerce”; c) tthe ordinance
imposes significant compliance costs; and d) if other localities
enacted similar ordinances “the aggregate administrative burden
67
and cost would outweigh the county’s legitimate local interest.”
Despite the plaintiffs’ showing, the Public Citizen court held that
“[a]lthough nothing submitted by the parties conclusively
attributes the low number of complaints [and inquiries] to the
ordinance’s regulatory scheme, overall the record indicates that the
ordinance generates local putative benefits, which benefits are not
demonstrably and clearly exceeded by the burden imposed on
68
interstate commerce.”
The ordinance was upheld under the
Dormant Commerce Clause because “the county cannot promote
the ordinance’s purpose ‘with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.’ The alternative, either no regulation or a regulation
targeted at in-state organizations, would defeat the ordinance’s
69
legitimate goal.”
This line of attack against the Pinellas ordinance might have
been bolstered by the argument that the local benefit was entirely
70
illusory in light of existing federal regulations and state fraud laws.
After all, is there truly a local benefit provided when the county
merely provides to the public a copy of the charity’s IRS Form 990
that is already available from the Florida Department of Agriculture
71
72
and Consumer Services and from the charity itself? The trucking
regulation in Raymond was overturned in a similar fashion when the
plaintiff in that case undermined the rhetorical potency of the
highway safety measure by pointing out that Wisconsin’s truck
73
length limit was riddled with exceptions. Even though challenges
under the Pike test rarely succeed, it may be useful to point out that
the choice is not necessarily between regulation and no regulation
at all as the Public Citizen court conceived the question, but rather

67. Id. at 1308.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The purpose of the Pinellas County ordinance was to “prevent deception,
fraud, or misrepresentation in the solicitation, use and reporting of
contributions.” PINELLAS COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 42-270 (cited in Public Citizen, 321
F. Supp. 2d at 1280). This purpose is duplicative, as indicated supra at note 23.
71. FLA. STAT. chs. 496.407(2), 119.01 (2004).
72. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6104(d)-1 to 3 (2004).
73. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 442-44 (1978).
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between adequate regulation and redundant regulation.
Additional useful jurisprudence may be available from the
74
Bellas Hess—Quill line of cases.
These cases provide two
potentially useful themes. The first is a bright line rule prohibiting
the regulation of interstate commerce where the regulated entity’s
only connection with the state is by common carrier or the U.S.
75
mail. This is particularly attractive because many charities only
have contact with most states by virtue of direct mail solicitations,
Internet solicitations, or telemarketing solicitations. This argument
was unsuccessfully used in a challenge to the Utah Charitable
76
The
Solicitation Act under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Tenth Circuit rejected the argument, saying that the Bellas Hess–
Quill rule was only a “bright line rule in the area of sales and use
77
taxes.” Although this reasoning comes from a federal Court of
Appeals and appears persuasive, it is unclear what principle justifies
evaluating tax laws and non-tax laws differently under the Dormant
Commerce Clause and rejecting normal legal reasoning by analogy.
78
In fact, in Pike the Court freely considered tax cases as precedent
79
in deciding the non-tax issue before it.
The second line of reasoning from the Bellas Hess–Quill cases
justifies invalidating statutes on the grounds that, if left unchecked,
the cumulative effect of states and localities enacting statutes and
ordinances could produce a regulatory morass. One of the reasons
the Bellas Hess court cited in overturning the Illinois use tax was
that
[i]f Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every other
[s]tate, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every
school district, and every other political subdivision
throughout the Nation with the power to impose sales and
use taxes. The many variations in rates of tax, in allowable
exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping
74. Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967);
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)
75. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758-59; Quill, 504 U.S. at 311-13.
76. See Am. Target Adver. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2000).
77. Id. at 1255 (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 316).
78. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 141 (1970) (discussing the
applicability of Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934)
and Chassaniol v. City of Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584 (1934)).
79. Pike, 397 U.S. at 141. The Pike court found these cases to be inapposite on
the facts, but made no mention that the legal reasoning from their opinions was
inherently inapplicable to a non-tax case evaluated under the Dormant Commerce
Clause. Id.
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requirements could entangle [the plaintiff’s] interstate
business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to
local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose ‘a
80
fair share of the cost of the local government.’
Given the complicated nature of charitable solicitation
regulation today–-with forty-three state regulatory regimes, at least
four localities seeking to enforce their ordinances on national
fundraising campaigns, and additional regulation from the federal
government for certain aspects of charitable solicitation–-it would
seem to be the feared “welter of complicated obligations to local
jurisdictions.” If the Bellas Hess admonition to consider the
cumulative effect of state and local regulation were to apply to any
regulatory arena, this would most likely be it.
Of course, this argument too would be countered with an
insistence that cumulative effect evaluation should apply only to tax
laws.
But, as noted above, it is unclear that such strict
interpretational rules were meant to apply to Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Moreover, in Quill the Court argued that the
entire point of Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is to
prohibit “discrimination against interstate commerce . . . and [bar]
81
state regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce.”
Regulation is just as likely to burden and discriminate against
interstate commerce as is taxation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current charitable solicitation regulatory regime in the
United States is complicated. It appears clear that this system is far
more complicated and redundant than is necessary to accomplish
its most commonly stated goals: informing the public as to the
charitable purposes for which solicitations are being made,
informing the public as to how the proceeds of charitable
solicitations are being spent, and protecting the public from
fraudulent solicitations. And while it would appear from a cursory
reading of Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence that this
mélange of different reporting forms, deadlines, fees, disclosures,
and contract requirements is precisely the situation that the
Framers sought to avoid when they established a common market
80. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759-60. See also Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6; Healy v.
Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); U & I Sanitation v. City of Columbus,
205 F.3d 1063, 1069 (8th Cir. 2000).
81. Quill at 312 (citations omitted).
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among the states, it has cropped up nonetheless.
There are numerous reasons why the Dormant Commerce
Clause has not been successfully invoked to bring about a more
uniform regulatory system. Courts have been reluctant to apply
jurisprudence from tax cases to non-tax cases. Legislators and
jurists nearly universally respect the legislative purposes behind the
various Charitable Solicitation Acts. Legislators and jurists are apt
to consider the regulatory burdens to be minor, particularly when
analyzing one act at a time. And perhaps most importantly, the
litigation environment does not favor challenges under the
Dormant Commerce Clause.
Charities are averse to litigation in general. While it is
expensive to comply with the various Charitable Solicitation Acts, it
is more expensive to litigate. Charities are also unwilling to risk
their reputations by challenging a statute meant to prohibit fraud
in charitable solicitations. And finally, the most successful litigation
against Charitable Solicitation Acts has been brought under the
First Amendment, which has focused attention away from other
avenues of attack.
Yet it seems that Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
was intended to prevent regulatory systems of precisely this nature.
The jurisprudential foundations for a successful challenge to this
regulatory monstrosity are already in place. The facts and
arguments demonstrating the burdens imposed by this system are
not difficult to assemble. The difficulty comes in finding willing
plaintiffs and in convincing courts that the benefits of these
enactments are illusory in light of other laws and therefore that
these local interests can “be promoted as well with a lesser impact
82
on interstate activities.”

82

See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (discussed supra note
41 and accompanying text).
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